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I. INTRODUCTION
The need for due process and the desire to achieve efficiency is
an ever-persistent tension in administrative law. With the amazing
growth of the administrative state, striking the right balance has
proven difficult.2 The Supreme Court's jurisprudence in this area has
attempted to guarantee due process while taking into consideration
the practical difficulties of maintaining an administrative state.3
The right to cross-examine witnesses at trial is an embedded
principle in Anglo-American law.4 Along with this right come
practical difficulties, such as the costs and inconvenience of requiring
the witness to be present at trial. In the administrative context, the
question of whether social security claimants have the absolute right
to cross-examine reporting physicians has been a matter of severe
disagreement in the past thirty years and has resulted in circuits that
are split over the question.
The Eighth Circuit directly addressed this issue in Passmore v.
Astrue and joined the group of circuits that follow the "qualified
right" approach, which maintains that a social security claimant does
* This article was originally published by the Missouri Law Review in 2009
and can be located at 74 Mo. L. Rev. 823 (2009). J. NAALJ obtained the
permission to reprint this article from both the Missouri Law Review and the
author.
1. 533 F.3d 658 (8th Cir. 2008).
2. See Robert L. Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38
STAN. L. REV. 1189 (1986).
3. See Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
4. See WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 1367 (3d ed. 1940).
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not have an absolute right to cross-examine reporting physicians.5 In
doing so, however, the Eighth Circuit relied on long-held
assumptions, and its judgment may warrant re-evaluation to ensure
that the rights of social security claimants are best protected. The
circuit split on this issue is reflective of competing values that are
practically inevitable in light of the tension between efficiency and
justice, and both approaches will be evaluated in terms of judicial
reasoning and policy. The rise of the administrative state presents
daunting challenges in terms of cost and administration, but this
should not deter the courts from stepping in to ensure that the rights
of citizens are protected. The growth, overwhelming complexity, and
extensive reach of the administrative state should not deter scrutiny
but provide all the more reason to fiercely scrutinize its procedures in
light of the guarantees of the Due Process Clause of the
Constitution.6
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
Eric Passmore slipped and fell in 1998, causing him multiple
injuries,' which he claimed resulted in an inability to engage in
substantial gainful employment.8  This prompted him to apply for
social security disability benefits and supplementary security income
in July 2001.9 The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) initially denied
Passmore's application, and, upon appeal, the Appeals Council
remanded so that the ALJ could obtain additional evidence regarding,
inter alia, a consultative orthopedic examination of Passmore's back
and the testimony of a qualified expert.'o
Dr. Charles Ash, M.D., conducted an orthopedic examination of
Passmore and submitted a report to the ALJ regarding Passmore's
5. Passmore v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 658, 665 (8th Cir. 2008).
6. U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
7. Passmore, 533 F.3d at 659-60; Passmore alleged impairments including
back problems, obesity, gastroesophageal reflux disease, diabetes, and anxiety. Id.
8. Id. at 659.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 660.
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back impairment." Passmore requested that the AU subpoena Dr.
Ash for cross-examination at an upcoming hearing.12  At the
supplemental hearing, the ALJ denied the subpoena request for Dr.
Ash, but instead offered Dr. Malcom Brahams, an orthopedic medical
expert who had reviewed all of Passmore's medical records,
including Dr. Ash's report, for cross-examination. 13  Dr. Brahams
testified that no medical findings supported Passmore's claims and
that Passmore was able to perform light work.' 4 The ALJ then issued
his finding that Passmore was not "disabled" under the Social
Security Act." After the Appeals Council denied review, Passmore
sought judicial review in the United States District Court for the
Western District of Missouri.16
Passmore argued that the Eighth Circuit, in Coffin v. Sullivan,17
had affirmed that the Supreme Court established, in Richardson v.
Perales," that due process affords social security claimants an
absolute right to cross-examine individuals who submit reports.19
The district court agreed and held that the denial of Passmore's
subpoena request constituted a violation of due process. 20 On appeal
to the Eighth Circuit, the Commissioner of Social Security
11. Id. The report indicated that Passmore could "occasionally lift or carry
twenty pounds, frequently lift or carry ten pounds, and occasionally climb, balance,
stoop, kneel, crouch, and bend." Id.
12. Id. The reasons given for the subpoena request explicitly detailed the
following issues:
the length of the examination, the medical records and film [Dr.
Ash] reviewed, his financial relationship with the Social Security
Administration ("SSA"), his hospital privileges, his current and
past complaints to the Board of Healing Arts, his prior history of
license revocation, the clarification of language used in the
report, and the nature and scope of his current practice.
Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. 895 F.2d 1206 (8th Cir. 1990).
18. 402 U.S. 389 (1971).
19. .Passmore, 533 F.3d at 662-63.
20. Id. at 660.
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(Commissioner) countered that neither Perales nor Coffin provided
that due process required an absolute right to cross-examine in the
social security administrative context.2 1
The Eighth Circuit held that the Supreme Court's decision in
Perales, referring to the right to subpoena a reporting physician for
cross-examination, was not based on the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment but instead stemmed from discretionary statutory
regulations. 22 Since the Supreme Court had not issued an opinion on
the nature of the right in question, the Eighth Circuit concluded that
due process does not afford social security claimants an absolute
right to cross-examine individuals who submit a report. 23
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The Supreme Court's view on the demands of procedural due
process, in relation to administrative law, has been in a state of flux
as reach of the administrative state has expanded. The Court has
recognized that to attempt to deracinate the administrative state from
the lives of Americans would not only be catastrophic but also
perhaps beyond the legitimate bounds of judicial behavior. In its
attempt to analyze procedural due process in the administrative
context, the Supreme Court has enunciated several criteria that
should be considered. 24 However, before addressing these criteria, it
is first necessary to consider whether the Supreme Court has
answered the specific question directly in Richardson v. Perales:25do
social security claimants have an absolute right to cross-examine
reporting physicians in a social security disability hearing?
A. The Supreme Court and Richardson v. Perales
In Richardson v. Perales, the Supreme Court of the United States
indirectly addressed the nature of the right to subpoena and cross-
examine a witness in a social security disability hearing. 26 In doing
21. Id.
22. Id. at 661, 665.
23. Id.
24. Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976).
25. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389 (1971).
26. Id. at 402.
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so, the Court's decision was nebulous as to whether the right to
subpoena and cross-examine reporting physicians in the social
security administrative context was derived from the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment or rather was statutory in nature.27
The case arose when Perales filed for disability benefits under the
Social Security Act, claiming that he became disabled as a result of a
back injury he received at work.28 His claim was originally denied
by the state social security agency, but Perales was able to submit
additional medical reports and obtained a hearing before the medical
examiner. 29 Perales formally objected to the introduction of several
reports by state medical examiners on various grounds, including the
absence of an opportunity for cross-examination. 30 The objections
were overruled, and the ALJ determined that Perales was not entitled
to disability insurance benefits because he did not qualify as
"disabled" under the Social Security Act. 3 '
Upon an adverse ruling by the Appeals Council, Perales initiated
an action in the United States District Court for the Western District
of Texas, which remanded for a new hearing before a new examiner
due to the court's reluctance to accept unsworn written reports by
medical experts as substantial evidence. 32 On appeal from the district
court, the Fifth Circuit noted that, since the claimant did not request
subpoenas from the hearing examiner to cross-examine the reporting
physicians, he was not in a position to complain that he had been
denied his rights of confrontation and cross-examination. 33
27. The main issue addressed in Perales was
whether physicians' written reports of medical examinations they
have made of a disability claimant may constitute 'substantial
evidence' supportive of a finding of non-disability, within the s
205(g) standard [defining 'disability' under the Social Security
Act], when the claimant objects to the admissibility of those
reports and when the only live testimony is presented by his side
and is contrary to the reports.
Id. at 390.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 393-95.
30. Id. at 395.
31. Id. at 395-97.
32. Id. at 397-98.
33. Id. at 398.
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The Supreme Court essentially agreed with this portion of the
Fifth Circuit's analysis, 34 but in its holding, and throughout its
opinion, the Court left opaque the nature of the right that Mr. Perales
had waived by failing to request a subpoena of his reporting
physicians." In a complex holding that one scholar has referred to as
"a triumph of verbosity over clarity," 36 the Court held that the
evidence presented by Perales' medical examiner could constitute
substantial evidence sufficient to deny disability, "when the claimant
has not exercised his right to subpoena the reporting physician and
thereby provide himself with the opportunity for cross-examination of
the physician."37
Following Perales, the federal circuit courts of appeal that
addressed this question split into two distinct camps, with one
claiming the right to cross-examine as an absolute right stemming
from the Due Process Clause and the other maintaining the right was
statutory and qualified.
B. The Eighth Circuit
The Eighth Circuit seemed to have addressed the nature of the
right to cross-examination in administrative hearings in Coffin v.
Sullivan.38  Coffin's attorney argued that the ALJ's use of post-
hearing reports violated the claimant's due process rights. 39 The
ALJ had sent letters to Coffin's attorney, giving him the opportunity
to object or propose his own questions in an interrogatory to the
medical examiner, but Coffin's attorney failed to respond and was
subsequently sent a copy of the responses to the interrogatory and the
opportunity to comment.40 In addressing whether due process was
satisfied, the court stated, "Due process requires that a claimant be
given the opportunity to cross-examine and subpoena the individuals
34. Id at 405.
35. See generally id. at 398-410.
36. Victor G. Rosenblum, The Right to Cross-Examine Physicians in Social
Security Disability Cases, 26 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 1049, 1049 (1999).
37. Perales, 402 U.S. at 402 (emphasis added).
38. 895 F.2d 1206 (8th Cir. 1990).
39. Id. at 1211.
40. Id. at 1210-11.
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who submit reports." 4 1 The court held that the procedures followed,
namely, the opportunity to object to interrogatories, comment on the
evidence, and submit additional evidence, did satisfy due process
requirements. 42  Because of Coffin's inaction, he had essentially
waived any right to cross-examine the reporting physician.4 3
In light of its language, several circuits interpreted Coffin's
holding as supporting the proposition that the right to cross-examine
reporting physicians was an absolute right compelled by due process
guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment.4 As it stood, the Eighth Circuit
appeared to have adopted an approach that gave claimants an
absolute right to cross-examine reporting physicians in order to
satisfy procedural due process.
C. The Fifth Circuit and the Absolute Right Approach
The Fifth Circuit, in Lidy v. Sullivan, read the Supreme Court's
Perales decision as conferring an absolute right upon social security
disability claimants to cross-examine reporting physicians. 45 In Lidy,
the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services
(Secretary) denied Lidy's application for disability insurance benefits
after relying on a report from Dr. Finney, an examining physician.46
The ALJ had refused to subpoena Dr. Finney for cross-examination
but allowed Lidy to submit a set of written interrogatories instead.47
Lidy, among his arguments to the court, contended that the AL's
41. Id. at 1212. The court supported this statement by citing to the now
infamous holding in Perales and an Eighth Circuit decision, which "questioned the
reliability of post-hearing reports when 'it was not possible to either subpoena or
cross-examine the interviewer because his identity was unknown."' Id (citing
Perales, 402 U.S. at 402 and McClees v. Sullivan, 879 F.2d 451, 452 (8th Cir.
1989)); Passmore v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 658, 663 n.3 (8th Cir. 2008) (discussing
McClees, 879 F.2d at 452).
42. Coffin, 895 F.2d at 1212.
43. See id
44. The Second, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits interpreted Coffin as the Eighth
Circuit's adoption of the absolute right to cross-examine reporting physicians. See
Yancey v. Apfel, 145 F.3d 106, 112 (2d Cir. 1998); Flatford v. Chater, 93 F.3d
1296, 1300 (6th Cir. 1996); Lidy v. Sullivan, 911 F.2d 1075, 1077 (5th Cir. 1990).
45. Lidy, 911 F.2d at 1077.
46. Id. at 1076.
47. Id.
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refusal to allow cross-examination denied him his procedural due
process rights.4 8
Lidy argued that Perales recognized an absolute right to cross-
examine a physician when a subpoena had been sought.49  The
Secretary contested this interpretation and contended that the right to
subpoena was qualified and based upon a proper demonstration of
need, as set out in 20 C.F.R. § 404.950(d)(1).o The Fifth Circuit
disagreed with the Secretary's interpretation and declared that
Perales stood for the proposition that, once a subpoena was requested
by the claimant, the claimant had the absolute right to cross-examine
an examining physician.'
In its decision, the court listed three specific reasons why it read
Perales as conferring an absolute right to cross-examine a reporting
physician. First, the Fifth Circuit looked at a particular phrase the
Supreme Court used in Perales. The Supreme Court's decision
included the phrase "the use of the subpoena and consequent cross-
examination," 52 which seemed to suggest that the request of a
subpoena to cross-examine a physician was an ipso facto showing
that the cross-examination was reasonably necessary for the full
presentation of the case.53  Second, the court cited the Supreme
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. 20 C.F.R. § 404.950(d)(1) (2000) reads:
When it is reasonably necessary for the full presentation of a
case, an administrative law judge or a member of the Appeals
Council may, on his or her own initiative or at the request of a
party, issue subpoenas for the appearance and testimony of
witnesses and for the production of books, records,
correspondence, papers, or other documents that are material to
an issue at the hearing.
This provision granting the ALJ discretionary authority to issue a subpoena for
cross-examination to a social security claimant is identical to the guidelines in 20
C.F.R. § 416.1450(d)(1) granting this same discretion to an ALJ in a disability
benefits case and identical to the language used in the relevant Perales statute 20
C.F.R. § 404.926. See Passmore v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 658, 662 n.l (8th Cir. 2008).
51. Lidy, 911 F.2d at 1077.
52. Id. (quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 410 (1971)) (emphasis
added).
53. Id.
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Court's holding in Perales, which declared that the claimant had not
exercised his 'right to subpoena,' . . . thus implying that the
entitlement to a subpoena is automatic. Finally, the court cited
opinions from the First,ss Second, 6 Third, and Eighth Circuits as
agreeing that Perales conferred an absolute right to subpoena and
cross-examine a reporting physician and acknowledged that it did not
wish to create a split among the circuits.5 9  The Fifth Circuit may
have been trying to avoid a split, but the circuits that subsequently
addressed the issue were not so inclined.
D. The Sixth Circuit and the Qualified Right Approach
The Sixth Circuit considered the same issue in Calvin v. Chater
and came to a much different conclusion than did the Fifth Circuit.60
Chater's attorney submitted a request to the ALJ to subpoena an
examining physician, but the ALJ denied the request because it
alleged no important facts to be developed through cross-
examination, which 20 C.F.R. § 416.1450(d)(2) requires to show the
cross-examination is reasonably necessary for a full presentation of
the case.6i The Sixth Circuit considered whether the right to
subpoena and cross-examine a physician in a social security hearing
54. Id. (quoting Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 410 (1971)).
55. See Figueroa v. Sec. of Health, Ed. & Welfare, 585 F.2d 551, 554 (1st Cir.
1978) (referring to the claimant's "right to cross-examine" under Perales and
administrative regulations).
56. See Townley v. Heckler, 748 F.2d 109, 114 (2d Cir. 1984) (stating that
"[u]se of such a post-hearing report violates a claimant's due process rights . . . a
disability benefits claimant has a right to cross examine the author of an adverse
report.. .. ").
57. See Wallace v. Bowen, 869 F.2d 187, 192 (3d Cir. 1988) (stating that
"[w]e construe [Perales] as holding that an opportunity for cross-examination is an
element of fundamental fairness of the hearing to which a claimant is entitled . .
58. See Coffin v. Sullivan, 895 F.2d 1206, 1212 (8th Cir. 1990) (stating that
"[d]ue process requires that a claimant be given the opportunity to cross-examine
and subpoena the individuals who submit reports."). See supra Part III.B.
59. Lidy, 911 F.2d at 1077.
60. 73 F.3d 87, 88 (6th Cir. 1996).
61. Id. at 89-90.
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78 Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary
is absolute or qualified by statutory regulations and adopted §
416.1450(d)(2)'s requirements for the cross-examination request.62
In its decision, the Sixth Circuit held that the right to subpoena
and cross-examine reporting physicians in social security hearings
was qualified.63 The court reasoned that Congress had delegated to
the Secretary "full" rule-making power under § 205(a) of the Social
Security Act.64 Acting pursuant to that authority, the Secretary
promulgated 20 C.F.R. § 416.1450(d)(1), which gave the AU the
discretion to issue subpoenas for cross-examination when he thought
it "reasonably necessary for the full presentation of a case." 65 Further,
section (d)(2) requires the requesting party to state the reasons why
the subpoena is appropriate and the important facts that the party
expects to solicit from the witness.6 6  Considering this statutory
framework, the court concluded that the "right" to subpoena was not
absolute but qualified by statute, and its reading of Perales was not
inconsistent with this interpretation.6 7
The Sixth Circuit cited the Perales Court's conclusion that
requiring reporting physicians to appear before administrative
hearings when need had not been properly demonstrated by the
subpoena request would be cost prohibitive and would constitute a
62. Id. at 90-93 (discussing 20 C.F.R. § 416.1450(d) (2008)).
63. Id. at 93.
64. Id. at 90 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 405(a) (2000) which provides,
The Commissioner of Social Security shall have full power and
authority to make rules and regulations and to establish
procedures . . . which are necessary or appropriate to carry out
such provisions, and shall adopt reasonable and proper rules and
regulations to regulate and provide for the nature and extent of
the proofs and evidence and the method of taking and furnishing
the same in order to establish the right to benefits hereunder.
65. Id.; 20 C.F.R. § 416.1450(d)(2) (2008) (stating that "[p]arties to a hearing
who wish to subpoena documents or witnesses must . . . state the important facts
that the witness or document is expected to prove; and indicate why these facts
could not be proven without issuing a subpoena.") (emphasis added).
66. Calvin, 73 F.3d at 90; 20 C.F.R. § 416.1450(d)(2).
67. Calvin, 73 F.3d at 92 (stating that "[w]e do not read Perales as suggesting
that the right to subpoena witnesses is 'absolute' in the sense that a party who
requests a subpoena is automatically entitled to its issuance whether or not he has
complied with the published rules governing such matters.").
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substantial burden on both time and resources. 68  In Perales, the
claimant never requested a subpoena to cross-examine a reporting
physician. 69  Therefore, the Supreme Court did not have the
opportunity or reason to comment on the requisite showing of need in
the subpoena request or the due process implications of a refusal to
issue a subpoena once requested. Nevertheless, the Sixth Circuit
assumed that the Perales Court would have also denied Perales the
right to cross-examine if his subpoena request had not complied with
statutory guidelines, based upon the same rationale concerning the
associated administrative burden. 70 The Sixth Circuit next addressed
the Fifth Circuit's decision in Lidy and found little in the way of
agreement.
The Sixth Circuit dismissed the Fifth Circuit's reading of the
statement in Perales that use of the subpoena results in a "consequent
cross-examination"7 as inappropriately concluding that a deficient
request per statutory guidelines results in an automatic cross-
examination. 72 Pursuant to statutory guidance in the Administrative
Procedure Act, the right to subpoena is qualified by the requirement
that it be necessary "for a full and true disclosure of the facts."7 A
subpoena request that fails to meet this standard, therefore, runs afoul
of the procedures set in place by the Secretary, and its denial does not
constitute a denial of procedural due process, but rather procedural
due process's fulfillment.
The Sixth Circuit also discounted the court's observation in Lidy
that the Perales Court did not refer to the "right to request a
subpoena" but "[the] right to subpoena the reporting physician."74 In
Perales, the Sixth Circuit noted, the Court was merely considering
whether the ALJ's determination could be based on evidence that had
not been subject to cross-examination, because the claimant had
effectively waived his "right" by not making the request for a
subpoena. The Sixth Circuit essentially asserted that the Supreme
68. Id. at 92 (citing Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 406 (1971)).
69. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 404 (1971).
70. Calvin, 73 F.3d at 92.
71. Perales, 402 U.S. at 410.
72. Calvin, 73 F.3d at 92-93.
73. Id. at 93 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 556(d)).
74. Id. (citing Lidy v. Sullivan, 911 F.2d 1075, 1077 (5th Cir. 1990)).
75. Id. at 92-93.
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Court was less than precise in its wording due to the exact nature of
the question being asked in Perales and that it was unlikely the Court
was suggesting that the right was absolute without regard to the
regulatory requirements. 76
The Sixth Circuit's reading of Perales supported the "qualified"
approach to the right of cross-examination in social security hearings.
Under this reading, the right to subpoena and cross-examine
reporting physicians is qualified by the mandatory showing prior to
the subpoena that the cross-examination is "reasonably necessary for
the full presentation of a case."7
IV. THE INSTANT DECISION
The Eighth Circuit addressed three main issues in Passmore: first,
whether the Supreme Court's decision in Perales actually conferred
an absolute right upon social security disability claimants to cross-
examine reporting physicians; second, whether the Eighth Circuit in
Coffin had recognized an absolute right to cross-examine; and third,
if both of the previous questions were answered in the negative,
whether the requirements of due process confer an absolute right on
social security claimants to cross-examine reporting physicians.7 8
A. The Perales Decision
The court first considered the Supreme Court's Perales decision
and addressed whether the Court had actually held that the right to
cross-examine reporting physicians was an absolute right.79  The
Eighth Circuit answered in the negative.8 0 The court read Perales as
being ambiguous as to whether the right to cross-examine reporting
physicians was absolute or qualified per statute.8' According to the
instant court, the Supreme Court never explicitly stated whether this
right was one that emanated directly from the Due Process Clause of
76. Id. at 93.
77. 20 C.F.R. § 416.1450(d)(1) (2008).
78. See Passmore v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 658 (8th Cir. 2008).
79. Id. at 660-62.
80. Id. at 661-62.
81. Id.
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the Fifth Amendment or rather was conferred upon the claimant per
statutory regulations. 82
The Eighth Circuit then inferred that the right was statutory.83
The court referred to the Perales Court's reasoning that, even though
the claimant argued he was denied his right to cross-examine, he had
waived his right to confrontation and cross-examination because he
did not follow the procedures set out in 20 C.F.R. § 404.926 to
request subpoenas for reporting physicians.84 Therefore, since the
statute qualified the right to subpoena and cross-examine in situations
where it was reasonably necessary for the full presentation of the
case, the right to cross-examine was also qualified and could not be
considered absolute.8 5
Having concluded that Perales did not hold that the right to
subpoena was absolute in social security administrative hearings, the
Eighth Circuit then addressed the precedential value and meaning of
Coffin, which had previously been interpreted by other circuit courts
as adopting the "absolute" right theory of cross-examination in social
security administrative hearings.86
B. The Coffin Decision
The Eighth Circuit addressed whether Coffin did in fact hold that
a social security claimant had an absolute right to cross-examine
reporting experts.8 7 The court in Coffin, citing Perales, said "[d]ue
process requires that a claimant be given the opportunity to cross-
examine and subpoena the individuals who submit reports."88 As in
its interpretation of Perales, the court in Passmore said this language
was ambiguous because the phrase "opportunity to cross-examine"
could refer to either the absolute right to cross-examine or a qualified
right to cross-examine. 89 Therefore, because the Coffin court relied
on Perales, which the Eighth Circuit had now concluded did not
82. Id. at 661.
83. Id.
84. Id. (citing Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 404-05 (1971)).
85. Id. at 661-62.
86. See supra note 44.
87. Passmore, 533 F.3d at 662-63.
88. Coffin v. Sullivan, 895 F.2d 1206, 1212 (8th Cir. 1990).
89. Passmore, 533 F.3d at 663.
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establish an absolute right to cross-examine, and because Coffin was
ambiguous in its meaning, the Eighth Circuit held that Coffin did not
establish an absolute right to cross examine. 90
The court then added that, even if Coffin could be construed as
supporting an absolute right to cross-examine, 9 1 that support was
merely dicta and not precedential.92 The issue in Coffin was whether
the interrogatories submitted to the AU by a reporting expert
violated due process when Coffin's attorney failed to object to the
interrogatories, thereby effectively waiving the claimant's right to
cross-examine the expert.93 Therefore, any right Coffin may have
had, be it absolute or qualified, was inconsequential to the holding,
because the right had been waived. 94 Because the Eighth Circuit
determined that neither Perales nor Coffin established that claimants
have an absolute right to cross-examine, the court next had to
determine for the first time whether due process demands such a
right.95
C. Due Process and Eldridge
The Eighth Circuit began its analysis with the assumption that
procedural due process affords claimants in administrative hearings
the right to a "full and fair hearing."96 However, full courtroom
procedures are not required, since social security hearings are
deemed to be non-adversarial. 97 In order to determine whether
procedures granted in the administrative context constitute a full and
fair hearing in a non-adversarial setting, the Supreme Court, in
Mathews v. Eldridge, recognized three factors that courts must
balance to determine whether the safeguards in place satisfy the
demands of the Due Process Clause or if additional procedures are
90. Id.
91. The court acknowledged that Coffin had been so construed. Id. at 662.
See supra note 44.
92. Passmore, 533 F.3d at 663.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. (citing Hepp v. Astrue, 511 F.3d 798, 804 (8th Cir. 2008)).
97. Id. at 663-64.
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necessary. 9 8 According to the Eldridge balancing test, the court must
weigh
[f]irst, the private interest that will be affected by the
official action; second, the risk of an erroneous
deprivation of such interest through the procedures
used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or
substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the
Government's interest, including the function
involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that
the additional or substitute procedural requirement
would entail. 99
The Eighth Circuit found the Sixth Circuit's application of the
Eldridge balancing test persuasive in Flatford v. Chater,00 which
also considered whether due process affords a social security
claimant an absolute right to cross-examine.'o' The Sixth Circuit in
Flatford confronted a situation in which no cardiologist in the
vicinity of Knoxville, Tennessee, would serve as a medical advisor to
the Social Security Administration.102  In response, the ALJ sent
interrogatories to a doctor who lived in another state, but the ALJ
refused to subpoena the examining physician for a cross-
examination, offering instead to serve him with further
interrogatories.1 03 Flatford, on appeal, argued that his right to cross-
examine was absolute, 104 and the Sixth Circuit, applying the Eldridge
balancing test, determined that due process did not require the
absolute right to cross-examine.105
The Eighth Circuit adopted the Sixth Circuit's analysis of the
Eldridge balancing factors in Flatford.10 6  The first prong, the
claimant's private interest involved, is the claimant's "interest in a
98. Id. at 664.
99. Id. (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)).
100. 93 F.3d 1296 (6th Cir. 1996).
101. Id. at 1305-07.
102. Id. at 1297-98.
103. Id. at 1298.
104. Id. at 1299.
105. Id. at 1305-07.
106. Passmore v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 658, 665 (8th Cir. 2008).
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fair determination of his qualification (or lack thereof) for social
security disability benefits and a meaningful opportunity to present
his case."o 7 Due to the non-adversarial nature of the social security
adjudication, the cross-examination of every physician is less
important than it would be if the hearing were in the traditional
adversarial judicial context. 0 8
The second factor to consider was the risk of an erroneous
deprivation of that interest and the probable value of additional
procedural safeguards.1 09 The Eighth Circuit concluded that, even
though the substitute procedures differed in Passmore and Flatford,
the Sixth Circuit's analysis applied equally to both cases and was
persuasive." 0 In Flatford, the ALJ sent the reporting physician
interrogatories in lieu of cross-examination."' In Passmore, Dr.
Brahams testified in the place of the reporting physician, Dr. Ash." 2
Both were orthopedic medical experts and competent to testify in the
case.113 Passmore was able to question the substitute physician,
confronted evidence he thought was suspect, and was granted the
opportunity to gather further clarification from his original examining
physician through the use of interrogatories." 4 The Eighth Circuit
determined that, although cross-examination was denied, neither the
procedure used in Flatford nor the procedure used in Passmore
"created a greater risk of an erroneous deprivation of [the claimant's]
interest.""
107. Id. at 664 (quoting Flatford, 93 F.3d at 1306). The Eighth Circuit
opinion addresses the first question in any procedural due process claim of
"whether the claimant has been deprived of a protected liberty or property interest"
in a footnote. Id. at 664 n.4 . The Eighth Circuit followed the Supreme Court's
lead in Perales, where the Court assumed arguendo that "due process applied to
social security disability hearings without determining whether [the claimant] had a
property interest." Id. (citing Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401-02 (1971)).
The Second Circuit also adopted the Sixth Circuit's reasoning in Flatford as
persuasive. See Yancey v. Apfel, 145 F.3d 106, 112-13 (2d Cir. 1998).
108. Passmore, 533 F.3d at 664.
109. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
110. Passmore, 533 F.3d at 665.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
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The final factor to consider was the fiscal and administrative
burdens that alternative procedural safeguards would require.116 The
Eighth Circuit agreed with the Sixth Circuit's analysis of the third
prong of Eldridge, which takes into account the increased burdens on
the government that come along with additional procedural
protections." 7 Both courts concluded that allowing the absolute right
to cross-examine a reporting physician would be a "significant"
burden on the government and the ability of the ALJ to exercise
discretion in granting or denying cross-examination of participating
physicians was necessary to the administrative scheme." 8
Considering the three prongs of Eldridge, the Eighth Circuit followed
the Sixth Circuit's lead and concluded that "due process does not
afford social security claimants an absolute right to cross-examine
individuals who submit a report." 1 9
V. COMMENT
The Eighth Circuit's determination that Perales did not provide
the absolute right to cross-examine reporting physicians is sound and
persuasive. The main issue addressed in Perales was not the nature
of the "right" to cross-examine, but whether the evidence submitted
to deny Perales's disability status was sufficient.120 As such, the
Supreme Court never directly considered the nature of the right to
cross-examination other than to conclude that the claimant, by not
requesting a subpoena, waived the right.121
In Perales, the Supreme Court's use of language implying an
absolute right is sparse and unpersuasive. The Court may have been
sloppy referring to the claimant's "right to cross-examine" since that
"right" was not exercised as a result of the claimant's waiver. The
Court's use of the phrase "subpoena and consequent cross-
examination" without any qualifiers may have been assuming
arguendo that the right was absolute, thereby granting the appellant
116. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
117. Passmore, 533 F.3d at 665.
118. Id.
119. Id. The Second Circuit adopted the Sixth Circuit's application of
Eldridge as well in Yancey v. Apfel, 145 F.3d 106, 113 (2d Cir. 1998).
120. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 390 (1971).
121. Id. at 404-05.
85Spring 2010 There but for the Grace of God Go I
86 Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary
the strongest possible argument, which was itself not sufficient.
Whatever the reasoning of the Court was in using the language it
did, it is unlikely the Court would have enumerated such an absolute
right so carelessly or haphazardly. Since the Supreme Court had not
answered the question directly and the Eighth Circuit determined that
it had not answered it either, it was now up to the Eighth Circuit to
address the question anew.
The Eighth Circuit's adoption of the Sixth Circuit's analysis of
the Eldridge factors in Flafordl22 accords with the trend of courts
towards balancing the needs of process and efficiency. However,
some assumptions have been made and questions left unanswered
that at least warrant some re-consideration of the Eldridge balancing
factors as they concern the right to cross-examine reporting
physicians in social security disability hearings.
The initial assumption in denying social security claimants the
absolute right to cross-examine reporting physicians is that the
hearings are non-adversarial.123  In Perales, Justice Blackmun
contended that social security hearings are essentially non-adversarial
because the social security administration acts as an adjudicator, not
an advocate or adversary, and this has been the view the courts have
since maintained.124 As a result of this non-adversarial nature, full
courtroom procedures are not required. 125
Justice Douglas's dissent in Perales disagreed with this
assumption of non-adversariality.' 26 He admonished the Court,
pointing out that grave injustices caused by a powerful federal
bureaucracy are a matter of concern for all.127 Douglas argued that
the failure to provide for an opportunity to cross-examine reporting
physicians was a primary defect in the social security system.128
Douglas wrote,
122. Flatford v. Chater, 93 F.3d 1296 (6th Cir. 1996).
123. Passmore, 533 F.3d at 663-64.
124. Perales, 402 U.S. at 403; Passmore, 533 F.3d at 663-64.
125. Hepp v. Astrue, 511 F.3d 798, 804 (8th Cir. 2008).
126. Perales, 402 U.S. at 414.
127. Id. at 413. Justice Douglas described that the reaction of the common
man to this federal bureaucracy was to say, "There but for the grace of God go I."
Id.
128. Id. at 414.
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The vice is in the procedure which allows [evidence]
in without testing it by cross-examination. Those
defending a claim look to defense-minded experts for
their salvation. Those who press for recognition of a
claim look to other experts. The problem of the law is
to give advantage to neither, but to let trial by ordeal
of cross-examination distill the truth.12 9
The inherent assumption in Justice Douglas's argument is that the
social security administrative hearing is nothing if not adversarial.
Perales's counsel argued before the Court that the government's
position, that the forum is non-adversarial, is not reflected in
reality.130 It is a system in which the ALJ gathers evidence, decides
which evidence to allow, and seeks to build the government's case
against the claimant.' 3 ' The ALJ, though not advocating for his or her
own interests, is a part of the system and serves as the system's
advocate.132
Even if the system is considered non-adversarial, as Professor
Rosenblum argues, the decision of whether to grant the right of cross-
examination, because of the nature of the forum, rewards form over
substance.133 The Anglo-American jurisprudential system has long
recognized that the virtue of cross-examination is not dependent on
the nature of the forum but serves to enhance the credibility of the
evidence solicited.134 The function of cross-examination is to ensure
129. Id.
130. Rosenblum, supra note 36, at 1063.
131. Id.
132. Institutional bias is not a new concept and is a rather difficult one to
prove. However, "there is technical literature that treats of the bureau's utility
function, and it is habitual at a commonsense level to view organizations, if not as
having goals of their own, at least as behaving as if they did." JERRY L. MASHAW,
BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE: MANAGING SOCIAL SECURITY AND DISABILITY CLAIMS
68-69 (1983). An organization tends to act to preserve itself and increase its
wealth, status, and importance. Id. at 69. Finally, these high-level, abstract goals
may be imposed to lower-level bureaucratic imperatives, which may affect the way
ALJs perform and conduct their hearings. Id.
133. Rosenblum, supra note 36, at 1063.
134. Wigmore stated that
[fjor two centuries past, the policy of the Anglo-American
system of evidence has been to regard the necessity of testing by
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that the best and most accurate evidence is presented before the
judge.'3 5  The mere fact that the system is deemed to be non-
adversarial does not negate the function of cross-examination as a
necessary device to ensure the best quality of evidence.
Arguments have been advanced contending that, since the
evidence being contested is essentially the interpretation of objective
medical evidence, the opportunity for the claimant to issue
interrogatories and present his own physicians and reports eliminates
the need for an absolute right to cross-examine. 136 There are three
points that deserve consideration. First, the Supreme Court's holding
in Perales may warrant some caution. The Court held in Perales that
if the only evidence the Social Security Administration has against
the claimant's contention of disability is one report by an examining
physician, which is hearsay in character and in direct conflict with
the claimant's medical evidence and testimony, then it can be
considered substantial evidence to warrant a denial of benefits.137
Such an arguably low threshold of evidence required for an adverse
ruling should caution against allowing evidence to be submitted by
reporting physicians without the crucible of cross-examination if the
cross-examination as a vital feature of the law. The belief that no
safeguard for testing the value of human statements is
comparable to that furnished by cross-examination, and the
conviction that no statement (unless by special exception) should
be used as testimony until it has been probed and sublimated by
that test, has found increasing strength in lengthening experience.
Id. (citing WIGMORE ON EvIDENCE § 1367 (3d ed. 1940)).
135. In Goldberg v. Kelly, the Supreme Court also recognized the limit to the
effectiveness of interrogatories in administrative proceedings. 397 U.S. 254, 269
(1970). The Court held that a welfare recipient had the right to be heard before the
rescission of benefits because
written submissions do not afford the flexibility of oral
presentations; they do not permit the recipient to mold his
argument to the issues the decision maker appears to regard as
important. Particularly where credibility and veracity are at issue,
as they must be in many termination proceedings, written
submissions are a wholly unsatisfactory basis for decision.
Id.
136. Flatford v. Chater, 93 F.3d 1296, 1306 (6th Cir. 1996).
137. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 402 (1971).
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cross-examination is duly requested or found to be reasonably
necessary by the ALJ on his own initiative.
Secondly, objective medical evidence does not always remain
objective. Assuming the doctor is competent and performs the
proper tests in the correct way, which can be a far-reaching
assumption, the evidence must then be interpreted by the physician.
Much clinical evidence consists not of strict tests that provide mere
numerical data, but of subjective valuations that involve visual,
verbal, and manual examinations.' 3 8 Judgments resulting from these
medical evaluations are informed by the physician's professional
judgment and skill, and at times maybe even his biases, prejudices, or
momentary (or chronic) incompetence.' 39 To say that medical
evidence is objective and, therefore, does not require cross-
examination to ensure its quality is to deny the reality of both the
medical profession and human experience generally. Providing an
optional mechanism to ensure the reliability of evidence that consists
of, in reality, subjective medical evaluations that can form the sole
basis of the denial of benefits surely would not undermine the
scheme of the Social Security Administration. The rationale behind
administrative bureaucracy is to provide efficient mechanisms
through which to dispense government services fairly and to
eliminate the trappings and expenses of formal proceedings.
Efficiency and the reduction of costs are a benefit to all. Accurate
medical determinations are not a peripheral concern in this scheme
but lie at the center of the reliability and legitimacy of the system as a
whole. Brushing aside the traditional mechanism of cross-
examination, on which our system of law has so long relied to ensure
the quality of evidence, should not be done lightly and without
thorough re-examination.
Third, in cases where the claimant is alleging some sort of fraud
or bias, the court should be even more hesitant to deny cross-
examination. 140  The Perales Court recognized that, in Perales's
situation, he was only questioning the doctor's professional
judgment.14' There, "the specter of questionable credibility and
138. MASHAW, supra note 132, at 62.
139. Id.
140. See Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 269.
141. Perales, 402 U.S. at 407.
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veracity [was] not present." 142 However, when this specter is
present, the right to cross-examine is even more vital, as recognized
in Goldberg v. Kelly.14 3  In Kelly, the Court was considering the
termination of AFDCl 44 benefits without prior notice.145 The Court
reasoned that a principle that has stood firm in American
jurisprudence is that, when the reasonableness of government action
rests on fact-finding, the claimant must be given a meaningful
opportunity to respond.14 6 This opportunity to respond is even more
vital when the evidence consists of reports or testimony that the
claimant believes to be based on fraud, bias, intolerance, jealousy, or
vindictiveness.147 The Court further stated that the court system has
remained dedicated to this proposition and has severely scrutinized
limited due process rights even in the administrative law context.148
Thus, the Supreme Court has recognized, where fraud or bias is
being alleged, the heightened necessity for the opportunity to show
that the evidence is untrue.1 49 In Passmore's case, the reasons for his
subpoena request suggest that he believed his examining physician,
Dr. Ash, was biased in favor of the Social Security Administration.' 50
While the claimant may offer his own evidence as to his medical
condition, the ALJ has the discretion to determine which information
he deems to be credible.)51  Granting claimants the opportunity to
cross-examine adverse reporting physicians may be necessary to
ensure that the claimant has an effective mechanism through which
he can confront adverse evidence that could, in fact, be a sufficient
basis on which to deny benefits.152
142. Id.
143. 397 U.S. at 269.
144. Aid to Families with Dependent Children.
145. Kelly, 397 U.S. at 255-56.
146. Id. at 269.
147. Id. at 270 (quoting Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 496-97 (1959)).
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Passmore v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 658, 660 (8th Cir. 2008).
151. See Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 402 (1971).
152. See id One might argue that, if all a claimant must do to gain the right to
cross-examine a reporting physician is allege bias, actually suspected or not, it
would undermine the system. However, as with many areas of law, the discretion
of attorneys and their code of professional ethics, presumably, would operate to
limit this practice.
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Granting an absolute right to cross-examine upon request does
not necessarily entail a complete disregard for statutory regulations
set forth by the Commissioner in 20 C.F.R. § 404.950. This
regulation serves to provide a mechanism through which the claimant
may be afforded an opportunity to cross-examine reporting
physicians.15 3 The procedural requirements of this regulation are not
inconsistent with an absolute right to cross-examine. Section (d)(1)
of the regulations grants the ALJ the power to issue subpoenas when
reasonably necessary for the full presentation of the case, either on
his own initiative or per request of the claimant.154  It is not
inconsistent to grant the AU discretion to initiate the subpoena
process himself and then argue that, if the claimant satisfies section
(d)(2),1 5 the AU has either no discretion or limited discretion to
issue the subpoena.156 Essentially, satisfying the standards set out in
(d)(2) would automatically make the subpoena reasonably necessary
for the full presentation of the case. If the determination is done in
this manner, the ability of claimants to cross-examine would still be
limited to a showing of need, but the discretion and possible abuse or
incompetence of the AU would be substantially curtailed.
The standards set forth in section (d)(2), which constitute the
procedure through which the claimant must operate to initiate the
subpoena process, warrant a quick comment. 157  Section (d)(2)
provides that the claimant must "file a written request for the
issuance of a subpoena with the administrative law judge . . . [and]
state the important facts that the witness or document is expected to
153. 20 C.F.R. § 404.950(d) (2008).
154. 20 C.F.R. § 404.950(d)(1).
155. Section (d)(2) provides that the claimant must "file a written request for
the issuance of a subpoena with the administrative law judge . . . [and] state the
important facts that the witness or document is expected to prove; and indicate why
these facts could not be proven without issuing a subpoena." 20 C.F.R. §
404.950(d)(2).
156. Professor Rosenblum suggests that the shifting of the burden of proof in
this matter would be sufficient. Rosenblum, supra note 36, at 1065. Currently in
all the circuits, except the Fifth, the claimant has the burden to prove to the AU
that the cross-examination is necessary. See id at 1051-57. Professor Rosenblum
argues that the better practice would be to give claimants the presumption of the
right to cross-examine reporting physicians but allow the AU to suspend or deny
cross-examination for good cause when the examination is "irrelevant,
dysfunctional, or unduly repetitive." Id. at 1065.
157. 20 C.F.R. § 404.950(d)(2).
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prove; and indicate why these facts could not be proven without
issuing a subpoena."' 5 8 The nature of cross-examination is such that
requiring the claimant to allege with specificity the facts he expects
to solicit is often an untenable and an unassailable hurdle. Roy
Reardon argues, "Conducting an effective cross-examination always
involves instantaneous interplay with the witness . . . [s]pontaneity is
essential . . . ."159 Many times it may be difficult or nearly
impossible to accurately predict what evidence the claimant expects
to solicit from the witness. Especially in cases in which fraud, bias,
or incompetence is alleged, it may be even more difficult to predict
what evidence may be gathered upon cross-examination. Requiring,
beforehand, the information the claimant expects to solicit from a
witness may serve to substantially obstruct the claimant's ability to
make a reasonable showing that cross-examination is necessary.
The final point to consider is the heightened administrative
burden that would result as a consequence of an absolute right to
cross-examination.1 60 The Eighth Circuit accepted the Sixth Circuit's
contention that an absolute right to cross-examine would constitute a
significant administrative burden without offering any empirical
evidence.' 6 1 The Sixth Circuit assumed that almost every claimant in
a social security hearing would like to cross-examine witnesses.' 62
This assumption, however, may not be warranted.
After the Fifth Circuit's ruling in Lidy, which granted social
security claimants an absolute right to cross-examine, the Social
Security Administration acquiesced, and social security claimants in
the Fifth Circuit since have enjoyed the absolute right to cross-
examine reporting physicians.163  One scholar selected random
practitioners and asked them what they believed the consequences of
the ruling had been.' 64 Though the sample was not scientific,' 65 its
15 8. Id.
159. Rosenblum, supra note 36, at 1063 (citing Roy L. Reardon, Cross-
Examination-"To Sin or Not to Sin," LrIG., Fall 1998, at 30, 30, available at
Westlaw, 25 Litigation 30).
160. See Flatford v. Chater, 93 F.3d 1296, 1306 (6th Cir. 1996); see also
Passmore v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 658, 664-65 (8th Cir. 2008).
161. Passmore, 533 F.3d at 665.
162. Flatford, 93 F.3d at 1306.
163. Rosenblum, supra note 36, at 1055-57.
164. See id at 1058.
165. Id.
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results are instructive. One ALJ responder reported that, since the
ruling, subpoenas are issued for the reporting physician to be cross-
examined in only ten to fifteen percent of all cases.1 66  Another
interviewee responded that she believed that, because the examining
physicians were subject to cross-examination, they do better
examinations and provide clearer reports in the first instance.167 Yet
another interviewee responded that he had only very rarely requested
subpoenas and, when he did, the physicians resisted the subpoena.16 8
As a result, the ALJ struck the report from the record and requested a
new consultative examination.1 69 These anecdotal accounts, though
not scientifically drawn, call for greater inquiry. The Eighth Circuit,
rather than assuming the significant burden that would result from an
absolute right, should at the very least consider evidence to the
contrary provided by the Fifth Circuit's direct experience in the
matter.170
VI. CONCLUSION
The balance between a fair hearing and an efficient hearing is a
delicate one that is continuously being adjusted in order to ensure
that due process is afforded to the citizens in our administrative state.
The right to cross-examine reporting physicians in social security
hearings is a small example of a much larger framework that must be
scrutinized by the courts in an effort to maintain the balance between
due process and efficiency. The Eighth Circuit, in Passmore, made a
166. Id. at 1059.
167. Id. at 1059-60.
168. Id. at 1060.
169. Id.
170. Rosenblum concludes that
[t]hese responses strongly suggest that the negative conjectures
shared by the Second and Sixth Circuits [now including the
Eighth Circuit as well] and the Solicitor General regarding the
effects of allowing physician cross-examination as an absolute
right should not be admitted as credible unless and until clear and
convincing empirical support can be found in the record to
validate them.
Id. at 1062.
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policy determination that the right to cross-examine reporting
physicians is qualified by statutory regulations and that this
qualification does not do violence to due process. In so doing, the
court relied on some common assumptions and possible
misconceptions. Whether the Eighth Circuit's determination is the
correct or preferable outcome is a subject of legitimate debate, but
the difficulties that are inevitably associated with making adjustments
to the administrative process should not prevent the courts from
thoroughly considering all the issues.
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